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REMEMBERING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD IN CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES BETWEEN A NATURAL PARENT AND
A THIRD PARTY
Grant v. Martin
757 So. 2d 264 (Miss. 2000)
Jennifer Garvin
I. INTRODUCTION

In determining who is best suited to have custody, care and control of a minor
child, the polestar consideration is the best interest and welfare of the child.'
Until now, in custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party,
Mississippi courts have consistently applied the presumption that the best interest of the child is to be in the custody of the natural parent.2 This presumption
could be overcome only by clearly establishing that the parent is unsuitable to
have custody of the child.' In April 2000, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted a new standard, holding that a natural parent who voluntarily relinquishes custody of a minor child through a court of competent jurisdiction, forfeits the right
to rely on the natural parent presumption and can reclaim custody only upon
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the change in custody is in the
best interest of the child.'
This Note will present an explanation of how and why the natural parent presumption originated. It will also explore various applications of the presumption
in custody disputes between parents and third parties over the past three decades,
as well as cases which seem to have deviated from the application of the presumption. Finally, this Note will analyze how the court arrived at the new standard, and discuss possible problems with the new standard, such as, whether its
adoption was necessary, and what effect, if any, Grant v. Martin' will have on
future custody cases involving a natural parent and a third party.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Robin and Scott Martin, parents of three minor children, separated in 1993.6
That same year, the Hinds County Chancery Court granted letters of guardianship over the children's estates and custody of the children to Scott's parents, so
that the children would have health insurance benefits.7 In the 1995 divorce,
1. Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).
2. See, e.g., McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 1993); Carter v. Taylor, 611 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1992);
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973); Milam v. Milam, 376 So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979); Hendrix v.
Hendrix, 83 So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1955); Walker v. Williams, 58 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1952); Bullard v. Welch, 158 So.
791 (Miss. 1935); Nickle v. Burnett, 84 So. 138 (Miss. 1920); Watts v. Smylie, 76 So. 684 (Miss. 1917); Morgan v.
Shelly, 72 So. 700 (Miss. 1916); Glidewell v. Morris, 42 So. 537 (Miss. 1906); Hibbette v. Baines, 29 So. 80
(Miss. 1900).
3. Hibbette, 29 So. at 81.
4. 757 So. 2d 264 (Miss. 2000).
5. Id.
6. 744 So. 2d 817, 818 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
7. Id. at 818.
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Robin and Scott voluntarily relinquished custody of the children by awarding
custody to the grandparents in the property settlement agreement.'
In 1996, Robin remarried.' In 1997, she petitioned the chancery court for modification of the custody order, dissolution of the guardianship, and return of her
three children, then ages eight, six and five.1" Only Robin and her new husband,
Prentiss Grant, testified at the hearing."1 Robin testified that she had provided
virtually no financial assistance for the children during those four years with
their grandparents, even though she had the means to do so.2 Although she had
the children every other weekend for visitation and spoke to them by telephone
each week, according to her testimony, she took little, if any, interest in the children's academic, physical or mental well-being.13 Robin presented no evidence at
the hearing to indicate that it would be harmful for the children to continue living
with their grandparents. 4 At the close of Robin and her husband's testimony,
counsel for the grandparents moved to dismiss."5 The court granted the motion
and dismissed the case without further hearing.16 The grandparents retained custody of the children. 7
The Chancellor applied the legal standard that the parent seeking to modify the
arrangement must prove a material change in the circumstances of the custodial
party that materially affects the best interests of the child. 8 As the Mississippi
Supreme Court held in Thomas v. Purvis,9 this standard should not be applied
when a natural parent is seeking to regain custody of the children from a third
party.2" Rather it is customarily applied to a request for modification of child custody between the two natural parents.
Robin appealed and the Mississippi Court of Appeals, recognizing the chancellor's error, reversed the chancellor's decision.' The court of appeals held that in
custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party, the court should
apply the presumption that the best interests of the child will be served by he or
she being in the custody of his or her parents.23 This presumption can only be
overcome by proving that the parent has previously abandoned the child or is
otherwise unfit to have custody. 4 The court of appeals, finding nothing in the
record evidencing unfitness or abandonment by Robin, held that the grandparents had no right to custody of the grandchildren as against a natural parent. 25
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 819.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Robin never met the children's teachers or saw their report cards. She did not know which dentist or
doctor treated the children. She never consulted with their mental health counselors about the change in custody
or any other matter.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 820.
19. 384 So. 2d 610 (Miss. 1980).
20. Id. at 612.
21. Id.
22. Grant,744 So. 2d at 820.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari and adopted a new standard
holding that
a natural parent who voluntarily relinquishes custody of a minor child, through a
court of competent jurisdiction, has forfeited the right to rely on the existing
natural parent presumption. A natural parent may reclaim custody of the child
only upon showing by clear and convincing evidence that the change in custody
is in the best interest of the child.26
The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to
the chancellor for a full hearing under the new standard."
III.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

A. Establishmentof the NaturalParentPresumption
Until now, in custody cases between a natural parent and a third party
Mississippi courts applied the presumption that the best interest of the child is
served by being in the custody of the natural parent.28 A third party can overcome
this presumption only by a clear showing that the natural parent has: (1) abandoned the child; or (2) the conduct of the parent is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child; or (3) the parent is mentally or otherwise unfit to have custody of
the child. 9 This rebuttable presumption was established at the turn of the century by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hibbette v. Baines' and is codified in
section 93-5-24 of the Mississippi Code."
Hibbitte was a habeas corpus proceeding brought in 1900 in which a father
sought custody of his son and daughter from their maternal aunts.' The children
lived with their maternal grandmother until her death and then with their maternal aunts for ten years following the mother's death.' The father supported the
children financially and otherwise throughout the ten years and intended to
reclaim custody of them after their grandmother's death.3' Despite the children's
desire to remain with their aunts, the court applied the newly adopted natural
parent presumption and held that the aunts failed to prove the father unsuitable to
3
have custody of his children. 1
26. Grunt, 757 So. 2d at 266.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 1993); Carter v. Taylor, 611 So,2d 874 (Miss. 1992); Milam
v. Milam, 376 So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973); Hendrix v. Hendrix, 83
So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1955); Walker v. Williams, 58 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1952); Bullard v. Welch, 158 So. 791 (Miss.
1935); Nickle v. Burnett, 84 So. 138 (Miss. 1920); Watts v. Smylie, 76 So. 684 (Miss. 1917); Morgan v. Shelly, 72
So. 700 (Miss. 1916); Glidewell v. Morris, 42 So. 537 (Miss. 1906); Hibbette v. Baines, 29 So. 80 (Miss. 1900).
29. Id.
30. Hibbette, 29 So. at 80.
31. MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(e) (Supp. 2000): "Upon finding by the court that both of the parents of the
child have abandoned or deserted such child or that both such parents are mentally, morally or otherwise unfit to
rear and train the child the court may award physical and legal custody to (i) The person in whose home the child
has been living in a wholesome and stable environment; or (ii) Physical and legal custody to any other person adequate and proper care and guidance for the child."
32. Hibbette, 29 So. at 80.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 86-87.

35. Id. at 86.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21:311

Rendering judgment in favor of the father, the Mississippi Supreme Court
quoted the Missouri Supreme Court in Weir v. Marley36 to adopt the law
announced in that decision asserting that children
must and ought to be subject to the custody and control of those who are immediately responsible for their being, for the reason that by nature there has been
implanted in the human heart those seeds of parental and filial affection that
will assure to the infant care and protection in the years of its helplessness...
that the primary object is the interest of the child, the presumption of the law is
that its interest is to be in the custody of its parent. 7
The court gave great weight to the natural presumption that a parent will love
and care for his child more wisely than any other.' In order to overcome such a
supposition, one must clearly show that the parent is unsuitable to have custody
of the child. 9
For the past one hundred years, the courts have consistently applied the rule of
Hibbette in custody cases between natural parents and third parties.4" The facts
of these cases varied, but the rule has very rarely deviated and has become more
firmly established with each decision.
B. Modern Applications of the NaturalParentPresumption
Since the adoption of the natural parent presumption by the court in Hibbitte, it
has been applied in many cases involving a wide array of facts. The following
cases demonstrate the consistency with which Mississippi courts have employed
the presumption.
In 1973, a mother appealed a divorce decree modification granting custody of
a child to his paternal grandparents in Rodgers v. Rodgers."1 The mother was initially awarded custody by the divorce decree.4" When she decided to move to
Florida, her former husband's attorney advised her that she could not take the
child out of the jurisdiction, and that she should leave him with his paternal
grandparents until she could obtain a court order allowing her to take the child to
Florida.' She left the child with his paternal grandparents, who, with the child's
father, subsequently filed a petition to modify the divorce decree asking that
paramount custody be placed with the grandparents."
36. Weir v. Marley, 12 S.W 798 (Mo. 1890).
37. Hibbitte, 29 So. at 81 (quoting Weir, 12 S.W at 800).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 1993); Carter v. Taylor, 611 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1992);
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973); Milam v. Milam, 376 So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979); Hendrix v.
Hendrix, 83 So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1955); Walker v. Williams, 58 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1952); Bullard v. Welch, 158 So.
791 (Miss. 1935); Nickle v. Burnett, 84 So'138 (Miss. 1920); Watts v. Smylie, 76 So. 684 (Miss. 1917); Morgan v.
Shelly, 72 So. 700 (Miss. 1916); Glidewell v. Morris, 42 So. 537 (Miss. 1906).
41. 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973).
42. Id. at 672.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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In the petition for modification, the grandparents alleged that the mother
engaged in various immoral activities such as adultery, fornication and drinking
45
alcohol in the presence of the child, but were unable to prove these allegations.
The chancellor, granted custody to the grandparents basing his decision on the
fact that there was a material change of circumstances and the best interest of the
46
child would be served by placing the child in the custody of his grandparents.
He did not find that the mother was morally unfit to have custody of her child.47
The Mississippi Supreme Court conceded that the mother was not a model parent; nevertheless, in applying the natural parent presumption the grandparents
were charged with the burden of clearly establishing that she was unfit to have
custody of her child.48 Because they were unable to establish that the mother was
unfit, the court reversed the decision of the chancellor and reinstated the original
decree.49
Courts have also applied the natural parent presumption when one parent dies
and the surviving parent is seeking custody against a third party.5 " The surviving
parent has a superior right to custody of the child against a third party absent a
51
showing that the surviving parent has abandoned the child or is otherwise unfit.
In 1979, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the presumption to such a case,
Milam v. Milam."2 In this case, the natural father, upon the death of the natural
mother, filed a petition to modify a divorce decree awarding custody of the child
to the mother.5 3 He also prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to
have the child returned to him.' The child lived with her mother and stepfather
from the time she was four months old until her mother's death two years later. 5
In the automobile accident that killed her mother, the child suffered a broken
leg. 6 For the two months that her leg was in a cast, she lived with and was cared
for by her maternal uncle and his wife.5
The uncle and the stepfather each filed an answer and a cross-petition. 8 In his
answer, the stepfather asserted that the father had abandoned the child and was
morally unfit to have custody of her. 9 The court did not find that the father had
abandoned her or was otherwise unfit to have custody of her, but, because of his
failure to support the child, the court awarded custody to the stepfather." The
45. Id.
46. Id. at 673.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 674.

49. Id.
50.
1986);
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Milam v. Milam, 376 So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979); see, e.g., Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952 (Miss.
Stegall v. Stegall, 119 So. 802 (Miss. 1929).
Id.
376 So. 2d at 1339.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
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Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the decision of the chancellor relying on
section 93-13-1 of the Mississippi Code,6 ' as well as Hibbette and subsequent
cases holding that a natural parent's right to custody is superior as against others
absent a showing of abandonment or unfitness.6"
In his dissent, Justice Cofer asserted that Hibbette was misapplied. 63 He noted
that the feelings of affection between the father and children in Hibbette were
absent in this case. ' He concluded that the father's conduct amounted to abandonment and that the custody award should have been modified only to afford
liberal visitation rights to the father. 5
In 1980, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the natural parent presumption
in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party even when the
natural parent had previously been ruled unfit to have custody of the child. In
Thomas v. Purvis, the original divorce decree recited that the court had previously ordered the children to be placed in the temporary custody of the Leake
County Welfare Department and that both parents were unfit to have custody 7
The chancery court granted custody to the paternal grandparents, with the right
of the maternal grandparents to have custody during the summer months, and
with certain visitation rights to the parents of the children.66
After the divorce, the mother remarried and petitioned the court to modify the
final decree.69 The chancellor determined that the mother failed to prove a
change in circumstances had occurred which materially affected the children's
welfare adversely, and he dismissed the petition for modification." The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that this standard only applies to modification
requests between parents of the child, and that the correct application of the law
as between parents and third parties was the natural parent presumption.71 The
court reversed the judgement of the lower court and remanded the cause to determine the fitness of the mother to have custody of her children.7
In one case, a father received the benefit of the natural parent presumption
even after a youth court referee found the child to be a neglected child and previously awarded temporary custody to the maternal grandfather until the final
61. MISS. CODE ANN. 93-13-1 (1972): "The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor
children and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education, and the care and management of
their estates. The father and mother shall have equal powers and rights, and neither parent has any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the custody of the minor or the control of the services or the earnings of
such minor, or any other matter affecting the minor. If either father or mother die or be incapable of acting, the
guardianship devolves upon the surviving parent. Neither parent shall forcibly take a child from the guardianship
of the parent legally entitled to its custody. But if any father or mother be unsuitable to discharge the duties of
guardianship, then the court, or chancellor in vacation, may appoint some suitable person, or having appointed the
father or mother, may remove him or her if it appear that such person is unsuitable, and appoint a suitable person."
62. Milam, 376 So. 2d at 1339 (citing Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976); Pace v. Barrett, 205 So.
2d 647 (Miss. 1968); Stegall v. Stegall, 119 So. 802 (Miss. 1929); Hibbette,29 So. at 80)).
63. Milam, 376 So. 2d at 1342.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1342-43.
66. Thomas, 384 So. 2d at 610.
67. Id. at611.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 613.

CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES BETWEENA NATURAL PARENTAND A THIRD PARTY

2002]

317

hearing of the divorce. Keely v. Keely was a 1986 divorce and child custody suit
between the natural father and natural mother.73 At the final hearing of the
divorce, the chancellor refused to hear testimony as to the custody of the child
and allowed the child to remain in the custody of the grandfather.74 Applying the
natural parent presumption, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's order. 5 The court held that in substituting the judgment of the youth court
referee, the court deprived the natural father of his right to be heard on the custody of his child and awarded custody to the father.7"
In 1994, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the natural parent presumption should prevail over the presumption that siblings should not be separated. '
In Sellers v. Sellers, a divorce action, the chancery court awarded custody of the
two children, only one of which was born of the marriage, to their maternal
aunt. 8 The chancellor stated that neither parent was fit at that time to have custody of the one child born of the marriage.79 The mother had one child by a previous marriage. 0 When she left her second husband she took both children with
her.8' After an alleged incident of abuse by the mother's new boyfriend, the
Mississippi Department of Human Services removed the children from the mother's custody and placed them in the custody of their aunt.8 According to the
aunt's testimony, during these three years, the mother only visited the children
ten to fifteen times and never had them overnight.' The father on the other hand,
had missed only three weekends and kept both children overnight on several
occasions.8
On appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the chancellor, because he "made no factual determination as to the fitness of either parent, nor did he state whether his custody decision was based on the desire to keep
the children together,"" as averred by the father.88 The chancellor's opinion did
indicate that keeping the children together was a factor in weighing his decision. 7 The court took the opportunity to declare that the presumption in favor of
awarding custody to the natural parent is not overcome by an imperative regarding the separating of siblings."
73. 495 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 1986).

74. Id. at 453.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

638 So. 2d481 (Miss. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 483-84.

88. Id. at 484.
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C. Apparent Departuresfrom the NaturalParentPresumption
As mentioned above, very few instances exist in which the court did not apply
the natural parent presumption. Most of these cases can easily be distinguished
from the usual custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party.
Perhaps the most difficult to reconcile with the rule is Forbes v. Warren."
In Forbes,the mother of the child died shortly after giving birth in 1924.91 The
father and grandparents agreed that the child should live with the grandparents.
Fifteen years later, upon returning to Mississippi, the father brought this habeas
corpus action seeking custody and control of his daughter. Evidence showed that
all parties involved were fit to have custody and control of the child. 2 Initially,
the grandparents were willing to grant the father custody with the child's consent, but the child was "passionately opposed" to going with her father. 3 The
chancellor awarded custody to the father and the grandparents appealed.94 The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that evidence that the happiness, welfare and
best interest of the child were with her grandparents should be controlling in this
particular case and reversed the decision of the chancellor." While the court did
acknowledge the existence of a natural parent presumption, instead of applying
it, it declared that the welfare of the child will prevail over any "mere preponderance of legal right in one or the other party."96 It also held that the wishes of a
child of sufficient capacity to decide for herself should be given special consideration when her parents have voluntarily allowed them to live with someone else
for an extended period of time.97 The court supported its decision mostly with
case law decided prior to Hibbette v. Baines. 8
The court attempted to reconcile its decision in Forbes with that of Hibbette.9
It contended that in Hibbette, the court considered the feelings between the
father and the children, which were of deep, tender affection."' Determining that
no such feelings existed between father and child in Forbes, the court held a
reversal was proper.1 Following this line of reasoning the natural parent presumption seemingly lends little weight to the natural parent's case in some
instances.
The court relied in part on Forbes in Governale v.Haley.1"2 This was a habeas
corpus proceeding brought by a mother against an aunt with whom the child was
living.10 3 In 1944, a few months after the child was born, the mother and child
90. 186 So. at 325 (Miss. 1939).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 326.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 325.
95. Id. at 326.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing McShan v. McShan, 56 Miss. 413 (1879); Maples v. Maples, 49 Miss. 393 (1873); Cocke v.
Hannum, 39 Miss. 423 (1860)).
99. Id. at 326.
100. Id. at 326-27.
101. Id. at 327.
102. 87 So. 2d 686, 691 (Miss. 1956).
103. Id. at 686.
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moved in with the aunt and her husband in New Orleans.1" The aunt cared for
the child while the mother was at work. ' The mother moved out four or five
months later leaving the child with the aunt.0 6 About two years later, the aunt
and her husband moved to Grenada, Mississippi, and, with the mother's consent,
took the child with them.0 7 During the following two years, the mother did not
visit the child and only sent $10 for the child."0 8 The mother then wrote the aunt
a letter in which she stated that she was never going to take the baby back and
that she could not take care of the baby.0 9 In 1948, the mother remarried and
went to visit the aunt and baby."0 She promised to send $5 a week for the child's
support but failed to fulfill that promise."' The child remained with the aunt and
started school in Grenada in 1950."2

In 1951 the mother filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody
of the child.'13 While no formal hearing was ever held, the court did enter an
order reciting an agreement by the parties that the child should remain in the custody of the aunt subject to visitation with the mother for the summer."4 The
court later entered an order dismissing the petition at the request of the mother. "5
In 1953, the child went to New Orleans for what was supposed to be a two-week
visit with her mother." 6 According to the child's testimony, she was forced to
remain in New Orleans." 7 A.year later, when the mother brought the child to
Philadelphia, Mississippi, to visit relatives, the aunt took the child back to Grenada
with her."8 The mother thereafter filed the petition at issue in this case." 9
The trial court, finding that to permanently displace the child from the custody
of the aunt would be psychologically damaging to the child, dismissed the mother's petition. 20 The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. As in Forbes, the court addressed the issue of the Hibbette decision by
asserting that
[i]n a particular case, however, when the parent, by agreement or otherwise, has
relinquished custody of the child to third persons and has permitted the child to
remain in their custody for a long period of time during which the parent has
contributed little or nothing to the support of the child and has evinced no special interest in the child, the court may refuse to allow the parent to reclaim the

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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child from those to whom it has been surrendered; and this is especially true in
a case where the forces of environment may be so strong that the condition of
affairs cannot be disturbed by a forced separation without risking the happiness
and best welfare of the child.121
While not using these exact words, the court, essentially, did apply the natural
122
parent presumption finding that the mother did in fact abandon the child.
Having so found, the presumption was successfully rebutted by the aunt. 23
In 1964, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that whether or not the father was
morally fit and whether or not the father had abandoned the children are not the
only criteria used in determining who is best qualified to have custody and care
of the children.1 24 Other circumstances examined to determine the best interests
of the child should also be considered in these cases. 12 Drew v. Drew began as a
suit by the nonresident father against the mother for custody of their two minor
children. 26' The chancery court found the mother to be morally unfit to retain
custody of the children but refused to award permanent custody to the father and
placed the children in an orphanage. 127 The chancellor did not find that the father
was unsuitable to have care and custody of the children, nor did he find that the
father had abandoned the children. 28 The father appealed the refusal of the chancellor to award custody unto him."
Considering other circumstances, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the chancellor based on the fact that the father failed to corroborate
his testimony that his sister and her husband in Michigan were willing to welcome him and his children into their home. 130 He also failed to show that their
home, financial condition, and other criteria would be desirable and beneficial
for the children. 3 ' The court also pointed out that the best interest of the child
was for the chancery courts of this jurisdiction to retain custody.'3
According to Mississippi court decisions in later cases,' the decision in Drew
did not change the rule regarding the right of a parent to custody over that of a
third person.'13 It was limited to the facts of that case. 13 The court in Mitchell v.
Powell 3 6 stated that "the additional guides set out in Drew come into play when
the parent is not entitled to the custody of his or her child.' 37
121. Id.
122. Id.at 690.
123. Id.
124. Drew v. Drew, 162 So. 2d 652 (1964).
125. Id. at 655.
126. Id. at 652.
127. Id. at 652-53.
128. Id. at653.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Daniels v. Lewellen, 254 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 1971); Newman v. Sample, 205 So. 2d 650 (Miss. 1968);
Mitchell v. Powell, 179 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1965); and Rodgers, 274 So. 2d at 674.
134. Id.
135. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d at 674.
136. 179 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1965).
137. Id.
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INSTANT CASE

In Grant, the paternal grandparents appealed from the judgment of the
Mississippi Court of Appeals.'38 The appeals court reversed the decision of the
Hinds County Chancery Court, dismissing the mother's petition for a change in
custody order, and rendered a decision in favor of the mother.'39 The court of
appeals reasoned that the grandparents had no right to custody of the children as
against their natural parent and that the mother's bid for custody must prevail
absent a showing of abandonment or unfitness. "' In other words, the court of
appeals applied the customary natural parent presumption. The Mississippi
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standard to be applied in
a request for modification where the natural parent, or parents, have previously
relinquished custody.14' Justice Cobb wrote the majority opinion for the court
adopting a new standard in such cases, with Justice McRae concurring in part
and dissenting in part 42
A. Justice Cobb ' Majority Opinion
The Mississippi Supreme Court considered for the first time whether the natural parents' consent to joinder in court proceedings granting custody to such third
parties should alter the natural parent presumption previously applied in custody
cases between a parent and a third party. 4 3 Understanding the importance of stability in the lives of children, the court "carefully weighed the impact of establishing an exception, or a new standard, for such instances."'" The court recognized the need to discourage irresponsible parents from relinquishing custody of
their child for the sake of convenience, and then coming back into the child's life
and claiming the natural parent's presumption as applied in the past.14 5 The court,
however, did not want to discourage the voluntary relinquishment of custody in
dire circumstances to a third party, when the natural parent is unable to provide
for the child's needs.'4 6 With these concerns in mind and giving little else in the
way of explanation, the court held that a natural parent in such cases can no
longer rely on the natural parent presumption as in ordinary custody cases
between a parent and a third party.4 7 In order to reclaim custody of the child, the
parent must show by clear and convincing evidence that the change in custody is
in the best interest of the child.'" The supreme court reversed the decision of the
court of appeals and remanded the case for trial under the new standard.
138. Grant, 744 So. 2d at 817.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 820.
141. Grant, 757 So. 2d at 264 (granting certiorari also for having found that it was error for the court of
appeals to reverse and render when there was never a full hearing on the merits of the case).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 266.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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B. JusticeMcRae 's DissentingOpinion

Justice McRae wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.4

9

While he agreed that the decision of the court of appeals should be

reversed, he disagreed with the majority's decision to send the case back for
rehearing to determine the best interests of the child.150 He asserted that once the
parties have gone through the initial custody battle, the natural parent presump-

tion was no longer available and the best interests of the child became the
polestar consideration.151 Under this reasoning, the chancellor used the correct
standard in dismissing the case, and the matter should not be reheard.15 2 The
chancellor found no material changes, Grant had essentially abandoned her chil-

dren, and that the best interests of the children was to remain in the custody of
their grandparents.5' McRae asserted that Grant failed to prove that the children's

best interest was for her to have custody of them at the first hearing on this matter, and she should not be given a second chance to do so."$
V ANALYSIS

Most states in this country have a natural parent presumption or a superior or
natural rights doctrine, offering a presumption or preference favoring the natural
parent over an unrelated third party. 15 5 Certainly all of these jurisdictions consider
disputes similar to that in Grant. Mississippi is not the only state to apply a new
standard to such cases. In attempting to keep the best interest of the child as the
focus in resolving such disputes, different courts have used different mechanisms. The Tennessee Court of Appeals confronted a similar situation by "carv-

ing out an exception" to the natural parent preference in "unusual exigent and
compelling circumstances." ' Other states support a single "best interests" criterion for all child custody cases, using the natural parent's unfitness as a consideration rather than a prerequisite for third party custody."7 Commentators have
suggested everything from totally abolishing the natural parent presumption'5 to
'5 9
broadening the definition of "parent.'

149. Id. at 267.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 268.
155. Lawrence Schlam, Third-Party Standing In Child Custody Disputes: Will Kentucky's New "De Facto
Guardian" Provision Help?, 27 N. Ky.L. REv. 368, 368-369 (2000) (citing State ex rel Paul v. Peniston, 105 So.
2d 228, 232 (La. 1958); In re Hernandez, 376 A.2d 648, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); CAL. FAM.CODE § 3040 (a)
(West 1994); J.E.C., Jr. v. J.E.C., Sr., 575 So. 2d 592 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); Uhing v. Uhing, 499 N.W 2d 366
(Neb. 1992); Abaire v. Hiimelberger, 558 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); In re Sedelmeier, 491 N.W2d 86
(S.D. 1992); Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W2d 599 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)).
156. Janet Leach Richards, Custody Conflicts Between Parents And Third Parties: Protecting The Child's
Interests, 29-Aug. TENN. B.J. 16, 16-17 (1993) (citing Henderson v. Mabry, 838 S.W2d 537 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1992)).
157. Lawrence Schlam, Third Party Custody Disputes In Minnesota: Overcoming The "Natural Rights " Of
Parents Or Pursuing The "BestInterests" Of Children?,26 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 733, 759-760 (2000) (citing
Wallin v. Wallin, 187 N.W2d 627 (Minn. 1971)).
158. Eric P. Salthe, Would Abolishing The Natural ParentPreferenceIn Custody Disputes Be In Everyone's Best
Interest?, 29 J. FAM.L. 539 (1990/1991).
159. Schlam, supra note 155, at 374.
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A. Should the Mississippi Supreme Court Have Adopted a New Standard
in Cases Such as Grant?
In the instant case, the court could feasibly have reached the same conclusion
had it applied the natural parent presumption. The court could have found that
Grant abandoned her children when she voluntarily relinquished custody of them
to their grandparents in the divorce decree. The grandparents, consequently,
would have successfully rebutted the presumption and would have been entitled
to retain custody of the children.
As recognized by the supreme court, sometimes it is necessary, as in Grant, to
relinquish custody through the courts in order to provide for the basic needs,
such as health insurance, of the children. In many such cases, a parent faced
with giving up his or her natural parent presumption, may be discouraged from
taking such measures to provide for the child. Is this in the best interest of the
child? In situations, however, when the natural parent provides nothing for the
child, has had little or no contact with the child, or takes no interest in the child's
life during the child's lengthy stay with a third party, the parent should not be
allowed to disrupt the child's life and healthy parental bond he or she may have
established with the custodial third party.
The supreme court was attempting to rectify this dilemma when it adopted the
new standard. Ironically, a solution already existed -the rebuttable natural parent
presumption. In 1979, Justice Cofer proffered the means to a solution in his previously discussed dissent in Milam.16 ° If Hibbette were to be applied properly,
the new standard would be unnecessary. In other words, a parent who, after voluntarily relinquishing custody of his or her child to a third party through a court
of competent jurisdiction, then neglects to take any interest in the child's life for
an extended period of time, should be found to have abandoned the child. A
finding of abandonment will successfully rebut the natural parent presumption.
This reasoning is similar to the reasoning of the court in Forbes6 ' and Governale62
discussed above.
B. How will GrantAffect Future Cases?
Prior to the Grant decision, the court based its judgment in child custody cases
on the notion that a natural parent will love and care for a child better than anyone else will. This sentiment is manifest in the case law and the statutes of this
jurisdiction. It is the law of nature and is difficult to overcome. As discussed
above, the court offers very little explanation for adopting the new standard in
Grant. While it does indicate policy reasons for its decision, no case law is mentioned or relied upon from this jurisdiction, nor that of any other jurisdiction.
The court does not provide much guidance for application of this standard in
future cases. One could reasonably conclude that the standard will be applied in
cases involving the same circumstances as in Grant, but what if the circum160. 376 So. 2d at 1340.
161. 186 So. at 325.
162. 87 So. 2d at 691.
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stances vary slightly? How broadly or how narrowly will the standard be interpreted? In cases such as Milam, will a father, who voluntarily relinquishes custody of his child to the natural mother in an original divorce decree, be allowed
to rely on the natural parent presumption as against a third party in the event that
the mother subsequently abandons the child or if the mother dies? The language
the court used indicates that the father would have to show by clear and convincing evidence that for him to have custody is in the best interest of the child.
Should a father, who has dutifully visited and supported his child while in the
custody of his mother, be saddled with this burden? Such an application may
prove to be problematic, as it would be contrary to section 93-13-1 of the
Mississippi Code.16
In Thomas, the court allowed a parent, who was previously determined to be
unfit, to rely on the natural parent presumption when that parent petitioned to
modify the custody arrangement.16 Similarly, in Keely, the court applied the natural parent presumption even when the youth court referee determined that the
parents had neglected the child.' 65 To apply the presumption in such cases but not
the case of a non-custodial parent asking for custody upon the death of the custodial parent seems unjust.
The court may in the future adopt a standard similar to that of Grant in cases
where the parent was forced to relinquish custody involuntarily or was otherwise
found unfit. Perhaps the courts will more narrowly apply the new standard. As
in Drew, the ruling of Grant may only be applied to the facts of that case. To
predict the consequences this decision will have on future cases would be difficult with what little direction the court has provided.
VI. CONCLUSION

In adopting the new standard, the court had the best of intentions-to insure
stability in the lives of children. For practical purposes, the new standard adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Grant is not a far stretch in the area of
custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party. The court, however,
made a bold move in dismissing the firmly established concept that the best
interest of the child is to be in the custody of a parent. Having done so, the court
should have provided more guidance in the application of the new standard, so as
to avoid misapplication in matters of such immense importance.
163. MISS. CODE ANN. §93-13-1, see supra note 61.
164. Thomas, 384 So. 2d at 610.
165. Keely, 495 So. 2d at 452.

